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Abstract. In bankruptcy proceedings, creditors have three main active procedural rights: 1) to submit a proof of claim; 2) to vote at a general 
meeting of creditors; 3) to satisfy the claim. However, some countries have adopted regulations that specify which creditors are allowed to 
participate in the proceedings. Such creditors are debtor-related persons, especially shareholders with subordinated loan claims. The Estonian 
Bankruptcy Act does not provide any regulations governing the participation of debtor-related creditors in the proceedings. Therefore, debtor-
related creditors could control the bankruptcy proceedings and the activities of the trustee during a bankruptcy, which harms the rights and 
interests of non-related creditors. The article aims to find answers to the questions: Should the law provide restrictions on the participation 
of the debtor-related creditors in bankruptcy proceedings in order to ensure the protection of the parties’ rights and interests, and should 
shareholders have a right to active participation in bankruptcy proceedings with a subordinated loan claim? This article attempts to find 
answers to these questions by comparing Estonian, German, Latvian and Lithuanian law.  
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Introduction  
 
Bankruptcy proceedings are collective procedures for creditors, in which the equal treatment of creditors is a 
guiding principle (Varul, 2008, p. 362). In a collective proceeding, creditors with similar rights must be treated 
equally (UNICTRAL, 2005, p. 11). The objective of bankruptcy proceedings is to put equal creditors in an equal 
position to ensure the protection of their rights and interests. The purpose of bankruptcy proceedings is to determine 
all of the creditors’ claims and satisfy them in proportion out of the assets of the debtor. This applies to the situation 
where the debtor is unable to satisfy all the claims (Varul, 1993a, p. 6; Varul, 1994a, p. 2; Varul, 1993b, p. 30). 
Creditors have three principal rights in the proceedings: 1) to submit a proof of claim; 2) to vote at a general meeting 
of creditors, taking important decisions that influence the course of the proceedings; 3) to satisfy the claim. 
 
Nevertheless, not all creditors can be treated equally (UNCITRAL, 2005, p. 11); in some cases it is justified to 
deviate from the principle of equal treatment. It is common that some creditors (e.g. pledgees) are given priority 
over all other creditors. However, deviations from the principle of equal treatment may not only mean increasing 
someone’s rights, but also restricting them. Debtor-related persons are put at a disadvantage in comparison with 
other creditors. The aim of this is to protect the rights of all creditors. Deviations from the principle of equal 
treatment are due to various historical, political and pragmatic factors. There are also a number of divergent 
objectives, such as ensuring legal certainty, in particular the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations, 
ensuring the profitability of the debtor’s activities, protecting workers, and protecting the principle of contractual 
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freedom (Kasak, 2010, p. 16). Therefore, some countries have adopted regulations that specify which creditors are 
allowed to file their claims, vote, and obtain the satisfaction of a claim. Restrictions are imposed on such creditors 
who are debtor-related persons, especially shareholders with subordinated loan claims. 
 
The participation of debtor-related creditors in bankruptcy proceedings can cause a number of problems if the law 
does not provide any restrictions. Firstly, it is easy for debtor-related persons to falsify claims and documents in 
order to participate in the proceedings. Secondly, shareholders as debtor-related creditors may file a claim based on 
loans given to a company in a situation where equity investment has been insufficient; such a loan may be a 
subordinated loan. However, a subordinated loan claim should usually be defined as a loan that is repayable when 
the claims of all other creditors have been covered (Vutt, 2008, p. 87). Thirdly, by filing the proof of claim, debtor-
related creditors have an opportunity to control the bankruptcy proceedings and the activities of the trustee during 
a bankruptcy, which harms the rights and interests of non-related creditors. Therefore, debtor-related creditors and 
shareholders-lenders are “closer to the business”, which should be sufficient to make them bear a higher risk than 
non-related creditors (Verse, 2008, p. 1116). Nevertheless, there are arguments against imposing the restrictions: 
shareholders might not take any entrepreneurial risks, and shareholders might exploit their insider status in order to 
recover their loan in full when the company is approaching insolvency. On the other hand, in cases that do not 
involve subordinated loan claims, the claim might be based on a normal transaction, which can be proved, so the 
participation of debtor-related creditors might be justified.  
 
The Estonian Bankruptcy Act (BA, 2004) does not provide any regulations governing the participation of debtor-
related creditors in bankruptcy proceedings. However, it is necessary to differentiate between passive and active 
participation in the proceedings. Every person entitled to vote is entitled to participate in the creditors’ meeting. 
Nevertheless, not everyone who is entitled to participate has the right to vote (Nerlich & Römermann, 2017, Article 
77 Rn. 1). Moreover, creditors’ claims should be covered in different rankings. Hence, it is necessary to determine 
whether debtor-related persons should have the right of active participation in bankruptcy proceedings. 
 
Under current Estonian bankruptcy law, debtor-related persons have extensive rights in the proceedings: they can 
file a claim, which in turn gives them the right to vote at the general meeting of creditors and the right for the 
satisfaction of the claim. This leads to a situation where non-related creditors rarely participate in the general 
meetings of creditors. The reason for this may be that creditors do not have sufficient legal certainty to participate 
in the proceedings, for debtor-related persons submit their claims, and obtain the right to vote as well as to 
participate in making decisions concerning the process of the proceedings and the activities of the trustee. Creditors 
usually do not have any additional funds available to hold court actions in respect of the determination of the votes 
or the acceptance of the claims. Furthermore, if all proving documents of the claim are submitted, which, however, 
may be ostensible or be based on the claims of the subordinated loan, there is no reason for court actions, because 
the law does not restrict the participation of debtor-related persons in bankruptcy proceedings. 
 
The Estonian Ministry of Justice has drawn attention to the need to regulate subordinated loans in 2016. In the 
insolvency revision project it was noted that regulating subordinated loans should be considered and the ranking of 
claims should be reviewed. In “Terms of reference for the revision of company law” it was also noted that the 
concept of a subordinated loan in Estonian commercial and bankruptcy law needs to be analysed. Moreover, the 
analysis of the concept and the proposed changes must be based on the need for a balanced protection of the rights 
of creditors and shareholders. 
 
Several international organisations have also given instructions on the participation of debtor-related persons. In 
2010, an INSOL Europe panel of experts prepared a report titled “Harmonisation of Insolvency Law at EU Level”, 
which listed problems that occur in the absence of common rules on insolvency. One of the problems was the 
ranking of creditors. According to the report, there are different rankings of creditors in each EU Member State, 
which might reduce the predictability of the outcome for the creditors. It was also stated that there are substantial 
and structural differences in the roles of the management board in insolvency proceedings in different EU Member 
States. However, the experts were of the opinion that it is not advisable to attempt to harmonize these rules until 
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there is greater harmony in the underlying processes (INSOL Europe, 2010). Furthermore, UNCITRAL has 
recommended that subordinated claims would rank after claims of other unsecured creditors (UNCITRAL, 2005, 
275-276). In addition, the Cork Committee stated that English law is flawed, because it does not have a rule on the 
subordination of shareholder loans (de Weijs, 2011, p. 237). 
 
Many countries (e.g. USA, Italy and Spain) have a regulation governing the participation of debtor-related persons 
in bankruptcy proceedings (Verse, 2008, p. 1111). For example Germany, Australia and USA follow the so-called 
“absolute priority rule” by prescribing that creditors’ claims must be paid in full in insolvency proceedings before 
equity holders are entitled to sell their shares during insolvency. Furthermore, it is often specified that shareholders 
are obligated to pay money into the bankruptcy estate that they committed to pay on the subscription of shares and 
which was not yet paid at the time the insolvency became evident (Sarra, 2007, p. 186). 
 
The present article aims to find answers to the following questions: Should the law provide restrictions on the 
participation of debtor-related creditors in bankruptcy proceedings in order to ensure the protection of the parties’ 
rights and interests, and should shareholders have a right to active participation in bankruptcy proceedings with a 
subordinated loan claim? 
 
1. Current law and case law on debtor-related creditors’ participation in Estonian bankruptcy proceedings 
 
1.1. Current law on debtor-related creditors’ participation in Estonian bankruptcy proceedings 
 
A number of countries (e.g. Germany) that have a long-standing tradition of bankruptcy proceedings have imposed 
regulations on the participation of debtor-related persons in bankruptcy proceedings. However, Estonian bankruptcy 
law does not provide any such regulations. In fact, many articles give general opinions on Estonian bankruptcy law: 
explanatory notes (Varul, 1993a; Varul, 1993c; Varul, 1994), general issues (Varul, 1999b), proposals for 
amendments (Varul, 2008), and the development of insolvency law (Varul, 1999a; Varul, 2013). However, none of 
the articles is concerned with the issues of the participation of debtor-related creditors in bankruptcy proceedings. 
Some articles merely mention that there are problems with determining the number of votes before defending the 
claims (Varul, 1993c, p. 52; Varul, 1994, p. 6). A general description of the reduction of preferred claims can also 
be found (Varul, 1994; Varul, 2004, p. 102), but no one has published a thorough analysis of and introduced 
amendments to the law on the participation of debtor-related persons in bankruptcy proceedings. 
 
Moreover, the BA only explains and mainly uses the term “debtor-related persons” in the context of the recovery 
of transactions (Article 117 of the BA). It provides a list of debtor-related persons, which, however, is not 
exhaustive: according to subsection 3, a court may consider a person close to a debtor but not specified in this 
section to be connected with the debtor. Therefore, the term “debtor-related persons” cannot be found in the contexts 
of submitting the claims, determining the number of votes and satisfying the claims. 
 
Article 93 (1) of the BA describes the submission of claims and simply provides that creditors are required to notify 
the trustee of all their claims against the debtor which arose before the declaration of bankruptcy, regardless of the 
basis or the due dates for fulfilment of the claims. Therefore, claims can be filed by all creditors. This means that 
shareholders can file their claims too, regardless of the basis and content of the claim, including subordinated loan 
claims. 
 
Furthermore, Estonian law does not provide special regulations on voting in separate creditor groups at the general 
meetings of creditors. Article 81 (1) of the BA simply prescribes that the decisions of a general meeting of creditors 
are adopted by a simple majority of the votes of the creditors participating in the meeting, and the number of the 
votes of each creditor is proportional to the amount of the creditor’s claim (Article 82 (1) of the BA). Thus, all 
creditors vote in the same group. Moreover, debtor-related persons, including shareholders, can participate in and 
vote at the general meeting of creditors and make important decisions, which affect the proceedings. 
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Estonian bankruptcy law does not regulate the satisfaction of debtor-related claims, either. Article 153 of the BA 
only prescribes that the creditors’ claims shall be satisfied in the following rankings: 1) accepted claims secured by 
a pledge, to the extent provided for in subsection (2) of this section; 2) other accepted claims which were filed 
within the specified term; 3) other claims which were not filed within the specified term but were accepted. 
Therefore, all creditors whose claims have been accepted by the trustee and other creditors have the right for the 
satisfaction of the claim; that includes shareholders who have filed the claim based on a subordinated loan. 
 
Thus, debtor-related persons, including shareholders, have the right for active participation in bankruptcy 
proceedings. However, although the BA does not provide regulations on the participation and subordinated loan 
claims of debtor-related persons in bankruptcy proceedings, the law should at least regulate the right to vote and 
the satisfaction of the claim which is based on a subordinated loan. 
 
1.2. Case law on debtor-related creditors’ participation in Estonian bankruptcy proceedings 
 
As already noted, Estonian bankruptcy law does not regulate the participation of debtor-related persons in 
bankruptcy proceedings. Thus, no comprehensive case law documents can be cited. Moreover, there are no Supreme 
Court decisions on the participation of debtor-related persons in bankruptcy proceedings. 
 
In spite of that, the author of this article describes some cases involving debtor-related creditors’ participation in 
Estonian bankruptcy proceedings. The present article is not a comprehensive collection of Estonian case law. 
Instead, such cases will be cited which demonstrate the main problems and describe the decisions made by trustees 
in Estonian bankruptcy proceedings. The objective of presenting the cases is to indicate that debtor-related persons 
have the right to file their claim. As a result, they can have the right to vote (Article 82 of the BA) and the right to 
satisfy their claim in the same ranking as other creditors (Article 153 (1) p 2 of the BA). However, the filed claim 
might be a subordinated loan claim by nature. Moreover, the cases demonstrate that debtor-related persons might 
have a majority of the number of votes in bankruptcy proceedings. Therefore, they may be able to control the 
progress of the proceedings and the activities of the trustee. 
 
The first case involves the determination of the votes of debtor-related creditors at the first general meeting of 
creditors. In civil case 2-13-32716, debtor O was declared bankrupt. As other creditors, debtor-related creditor B 
submitted their claim in the proceedings. The trustee determined the number of votes to the creditors at the first 
general meeting of creditors. However, the trustee did not determine the votes to debtor-related creditor B, because 
the proof of claim was not proved according to Article 94 of the BA. Creditor B did not agree with the trustee; thus, 
the number of votes was determined by a ruling of the judge (Article 82 (4) of the BA). The court did not determine 
the votes to creditor B either and noted that the proof of claim did not correspond to the requirements of Article 94 
of the BA. The court also claimed that it would be reasonable to apply increased requirements for the verification 
and justification of the claim to transactions with debtor-related creditors and to transactions of which both parties 
are one and the same person. However, the BA does not prescribe that increased requirements should be applied to 
debtor-related creditors. Therefore, the court’s ruling was inexplicable. According to Article 55 (1) of the BA, the 
trustee should defend the rights and interests of all creditors and of the debtor, and ensure a lawful, prompt and 
financially reasonable bankruptcy procedure. If the BA provided clear rules on the participation of debtor-related 
creditors in the proceedings, similar cases could be avoided, and the creditors’ rights and interests could be 
protected. 
 
In civil case 2-07-40620, there was a dispute over the ranking of a shareholder’s claim. Debtor R was declared 
bankrupt by the ruling of Harju County Court. The debtor had a shareholder, W, who filed their claim into the 
bankruptcy proceedings. Claims were defended at the general meeting of creditors pursuant to Article 100 (1) of 
the BA. The trustee determined that shareholder W’s claim belongs to the IV ranking of the satisfaction of the 
claims in the proceedings. However, according to Article 153 (1) of the BA, there are only three rankings. 
Subsequently, the trustee submitted a distribution proposal to the court. Harju County Court did not approve the 
distribution proposal and returned it to the trustee. The court found that since there are three rankings of claims 
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according to the current BA and the data on the ownership of the debtor in the distribution proposal was in conflict 
with the data in the Commercial Register, the distribution proposal did not comply with the requirements laid down 
in the BA. The bankruptcy trustee filed an appeal to Tallinn Circuit Court on the basis of Article 157 (1) of the 
Commercial Code (the CC, 1995)2. The trustee was of the opinion that the BA does not prescribe numbering the 
claims, but it has been recognized in practice. The bankruptcy trustee stated that as had been noted in the distribution 
proposal, the claim of shareholder W was to be satisfied after all the claims of other creditors. Therefore, the 
distribution proposal regarding the order in which to satisfy W’s claim is sufficiently clear. The Tallinn Circuit 
Court annulled the county court’s ruling and sent it to the county court for a new hearing. The circuit court found 
that it was incorrect to assign the IV ranking to the shareholder’s claim. However, the court agreed that the 
numbering of the ranking of claims is not prescribed in the BA and it was correct to only satisfy the shareholder’s 
claim after satisfying all the other claims. Despite the opinion of the circuit court, Article 153 (1) of the BA provides 
only three rankings of claims. Therefore, the shareholders’ claims must be accepted in the same way as other 
creditors’ claims, which are filed within the specified term (Article 153 (1) p. 2–3 of the BA). 
 
Other cases describe the acceptance of debtor-related claims according to Article 153 (2) of the BA. In civil case 
2-15-15226, debtor M was declared bankrupt. Debtor M had three shareholders: T, A and R. U and R were members 
of the management board. Shareholder T had 33.33% of the debtor’s share capital. U was a member of the 
management board of debtor M and of shareholder T. Shareholder T submitted two proofs of claim into the 
bankruptcy proceedings. The first claim was partially based on a loan claim and partially based on an acquired 
claim from other creditors. The second claim was also based on an acquired claim. Furthermore, member of the 
management board U filed the third claim from their third company P, which was also based on an acquired claim 
from another creditor. According to Article 103 (2) of the BA, the trustee and other creditors accepted all three 
claims, which were connected with the debtor. Hence, debtor-related creditors held 65% of the total claims in the 
bankruptcy proceedings. They also had the majority of the votes. Therefore, the debtor-related creditors gained full 
control over the proceedings, because there is no provision in the BA that restricts the participation rights of debtor-
related creditors. 
 
Civil case 2-14-61665 demonstrates a similar practice. Debtor L was declared bankrupt. L’s shareholder was J and 
V was a member of the management board of the debtor and of the shareholder. V submitted a proof of a claim into 
the bankruptcy proceedings. The claim was based on a fact that V had paid various bills and taxes on behalf of 
debtor L. Therefore, the claim was, by its nature, a subordinated loan claim. Furthermore, company Q, where V 
was also a member of the board, submitted a second claim. This claim was acquired from a Chinese company that 
supposedly provided consultancy services in relation to the identification of various marketing opportunities for the 
products. The third claim was submitted by a non-related creditor, but it was assigned to debtor-related creditor W. 
Since that bankruptcy estate was not sufficient for making the payments necessary for covering the consolidated 
obligations and the costs of the bankruptcy proceedings, the proceeding was abated (Article 158 of the BA). A 
meeting for the defence of claims was not held, but debtor-related persons could have obtained 100% of all claims. 
Therefore, the debtor-related creditors could have gained control of the bankruptcy proceedings and of the activities 
of the trustee. All decisions would have been made in favour of the debtor-related persons. If the claim of the non-
related creditor had not have been assigned and they could have made decisions in the proceedings, the proceedings 
might not have been abated, either. However, in this case, the debtor-related creditors were able to ensure that a 
claim for compensation for damages, an act with criminal elements, a grave error in management, or other 
circumstances could not be determined. 
 
In civil case 2-15-19333, debtor W was declared bankrupt. Debtor W had three shareholders: S, T and J. The only 
member of the management board was J, who submitted a claim into the bankruptcy proceedings. The claim was 
based on a loan. Moreover, the loan contract was signed by J. The signatures were handwritten; thus, the date of 
signing was not clear and the trustee suspected that the contract was fictitious. Therefore, the trustee did not accept 
the claim in the bankruptcy proceedings, stating that the circumstances were not proved according to Article 94 of 
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the BA (an action for the acceptance of the claim has not been filed in the court). Other objections would not have 
been justified, because there is no regulation stating that debtor-related persons cannot submit the claim into 
bankruptcy proceedings. Furthermore, if the claim had been accepted, debtor-related creditors would not have had 
the majority of the votes, but they still could have had an opportunity to influence the proceedings. 
 
In civil case 2-16-7967, debtor-related persons submitted a claim based on a transaction besides loan claims. Debtor 
N was declared bankrupt. Debtor N had three shareholders: L, T and F. L and T both had 33.33% of the debtor’s 
share capital. Both L and T also submitted proofs of claims based on a loan claim into the bankruptcy proceedings. 
Documents proved that debtor N paid their bills with the loan given by shareholders L and T. The trustee and other 
creditors accepted these claims in the proceedings. However, M – former member of the management board and 
former shareholder of the debtor – also submitted their claim from their company G (M was a member of the 
management board until 25.10.2013 and a shareholder until 25.05.2015, but the bankruptcy was declared on 
27.06.2016). This claim was based on a contract of sale and on the request to compensate for damages, as debtor N 
no longer purchased goods from company G. The trustee and other creditors (debtor-related creditors as 
shareholders L and T) did not accept that claim, stating that the circumstances were not proved according to Article 
94 of the BA (an action for the acceptance of the claim has been filed in the court). Debtor-related persons held 
62% of the total claims; however, the accepted debtor-related claims accounted for 43% of the total claims in the 
bankruptcy proceedings. The trustee accepted such loan claims as subordinated loan claims because of their nature, 
but did not accept the claim based on an ordinary transaction. One reason for this may be that the BA does not state 
that shareholders with subordinated loan claims cannot participate in the proceedings. Another reason may be that 
the lack of relevant provisions led to a situation where shareholders L and T could have controlled the bankruptcy 
proceedings and influenced the activities of the trustee. L and T ensured that the claim of the former member of the 
management board and of the former shareholder was subject to an objection, even though it was based on an 
ordinary transaction. 
 
Civil case 2-13-17637 is different from the cases described above. This case pertains to a claim for compensation 
for damages that were responsible for an uncompleted stock transaction. Debtor F was declared bankrupt. Debtor 
F had a shareholder R, who was also the only member of the management board. Creditor K submitted a claim into 
the bankruptcy proceedings. K was a debtor-related person: they were connected with R in many other companies. 
The claim was based on a claim for compensation for damages that occurred because of an uncompleted stock 
transaction. The only proof of that was a confirmation notice from R. The trustee and other creditors filed an 
objection to the claim, stating that the circumstances were not proved according to Article 94 of the BA. Debtor-
related creditor K filed an action with the court. Nevertheless, all parties reached a compromise, according to which 
debtor-related creditor K waived the entire claim. The second claim was filed from company L, which was bankrupt. 
However, the members of its management board and its shareholders were connected with debtor F. The claim was 
based on a sales contract. The trustee and debtor-related creditor K filed an objection, and an action for the 
acceptance of the claim was filed with the court. All parties reached a compromise again, according to which the 
claim was partly accepted. This raises the question of whether claims based on uncompleted stock transactions 
belong to the claims of debtor-related persons, although in this case, the creditor was connected with the debtor. 
 
Another question is that even if there are no provisions in Estonian legislation on the participation of debtor-related 
persons in insolvency proceedings, is it in accordance with the principle of good faith that debtor-related creditors 
can make decisions which have a significant effect on the proceedings as well as may harm the rights and interests 
of non-related creditors. 
 
The Harju County Court has processed a case involving a situation where debtor-related creditors participated in 
the voting process of the compromise proposal. In civil case 2-04-2165, Harju County Court adjudicated on a 
compromise proposal made during the course of bankruptcy proceedings (Article 183 of the BA). Debtor-related 
creditors voted for the compromise proposal according to Article 180 (3) of the BA. Thus, the compromise decision 
was largely based on the votes of the creditors connected with the debtor and of other creditors who were dependent 
on the debtor. Upon resolving the compromise proposal, the court found that the decision to approve the 
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compromise was contrary to the principle of good faith. The reason for it was the fact that the decision was made 
by debtor-related creditors whose claims were acquired by assignment. The court stated that the compromise is 
void if the decision was made with such creditors’ votes. Due to the ruling of the county court, decisions on matters 
of decisive importance cannot be made primarily with the votes of debtor-related creditors. This is in conflict with 
the principle of good faith and would damage the interests of non-related creditors. If debtor-related creditors have 
a majority of the votes, other creditors will not, in essence, have an opportunity to influence the decision in order 
to meet their interests. A question then arises as to whether such a court ruling is legitimate. According to Article 
183 (2) of the BA, a court shall not approve a compromise if the compromise has been made in violation of the 
requirements provided for in the BA or by fraud. The BA does not provide any regulations restricting the 
participation of debtor-related creditors in the voting process. Therefore, the court cannot refuse to approve such 
compromises which are adopted by the votes of debtor-related creditors. On the other hand, Article 430 (3) of the 
Code of Civil Procedure (CCP, 2006)3 provides that the court shall refuse to approve a compromise if this is 
contrary to good morals or the law, if this violates a significant public interest or if the conditions of the compromise 
cannot be enforced. Furthermore, according to Article 200 (1) of the CCP, a participant in a proceeding is required 
to exercise the procedural rights in good faith, and according to Article 200 (2), a court does not allow the 
participants in a proceeding, their representatives or advisers to abuse their rights. However, because of the lack of 
restrictions on debtor-related persons’ participation in bankruptcy proceedings, all decisions made by debtor-related 
creditors must be accepted pursuant to the current bankruptcy law. 
 
In accordance with the current law, trustees are forced to accept all claims from debtor-related persons if the proving 
documents are filed. In all the described cases, debtor-related persons whose claim was accepted by the trustee and 
other creditors had the right to vote and the right to satisfy their claim. Therefore, if they had a majority of the votes, 
they could control the proceedings. Even if they did not have an overwhelming majority of the votes, their vote 
might have been decisive. In current Estonian practice, non-related creditors often do not participate in general 
meetings, but debtor-related persons do. Thus, debtor-related persons can still make decisions on important issues, 
and control the progress of the proceedings and the activities of the bankruptcy trustee. 
 
Moreover, the cases described above demonstrate that the practice of the trustees is not uniform. Sometimes an 
objection to a claim of debtor-related persons is filed and at other times it is not, regardless of whether the claim is 
based on a subordinated loan. Regrettably, the rights and interests of non-related creditors are not always taken into 
account in practice. Therefore, it may be stated that the lack of regulations on the participation of debtor-related 
persons has led to the situation where the objection to the claim of a debtor-related creditor depends on who has 
control over the process of the proceedings: the debtor or the creditors. In the case of bankruptcy proceedings, the 
legislator should consider restricting the voting rights of debtor-related persons and the satisfaction of their claims 
to ensure the protection of the rights and interests of other creditors, including non-related creditors. This would 
lead to a more uniform practice as well as ensure that creditors have legitimate expectation and legal certainty that 
debtor-related persons cannot control the bankruptcy proceedings. 
 
 
2. Statutory law on debtor-related creditors’ participation in bankruptcy proceedings in other countries 
 
2.1. Countries that have a regulation on the determination of the number of votes 
 
The legislation of many countries’ contain regulations pertaining to the participation of debtor-related persons. For 
example, such regulations can be found in German, Latvian and Lithuanian bankruptcy law. Some countries (e.g. 
Germany) regulate both the right to vote and the right to satisfy the claim, whereas others (Latvia, Lithuania) only 
regulate the right to vote. 
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German insolvency law regulates the participation of debtor-related persons in bankruptcy proceedings, and there 
are regulations on the right to vote as well as on the right to satisfy the claim. Article 77 of the German Insolvency 
Statute (Insolvenzordnung) (InsO) specifies which creditors have the right to vote (Braun, 2017, Article 77 Rn. 1). 
InsO Article 77 (1) prescribes that lower-ranking creditors shall have no voting rights. This means that insolvency 
creditors are entitled to vote in accordance with Article 38, but subordinate creditors are not (Article 77 (1) p. 2, 
Article 39) (BeckOK InsO/Karg, 2017, InsO Article 77 Rn. 1). The reason for this is the lack of economic value 
(Schmidt, 2016, Article 77 Rn. 1–5). Moreover, as shareholders are at the bottom of the hierarchy of claims in 
bankruptcy proceedings, they should not be given a vote in the proceedings (Sarra, 2007, p. 198). 
 
It can be said that German law has a rich history of the subordination of shareholder loans (de Weijs, 2011, p. 237). 
InsO Article 39 (1) specifies who are lower-ranking creditors and which claims are considered subordinated. 
According to Article 39 (1) p 5, subordinated claims are, for example, general claims for the repayment of 
shareholder loans. The law prescribes an automatic subordination of loans provided by shareholders who own more 
than 10% of the shares or who are members of the debtors’ management bodies. Exceptions to this are claims of a 
shareholder who holds 10% or less of the company’s registered capital, unless the shareholder is a managing 
director (1), or if a creditor acquired shares of the company for restructuring purposes after the company has become 
illiquid or over-indebted (2). The rationale of the first exception is that the shareholder must have significant 
influence on the management of the company. It can be said that this provision protects the rights of shareholders 
who hold a small number of shares. The second exception is for outside investors and serves as an incentive for 
rescue attempts (Verse, 2008, p. 1113). 
 
Therefore, the question is whether a creditor is permitted to participate in the vote at all (BGH NZI 2009, 106 para. 
9) or whether there is an extraordinary reason for exclusion, e.g. in the case of conflicts of interest, in-house 
transactions or in the case of decisions against himself (LG Hamburg NZI 2015, 28 Rn 20, AG Iztehoe NZI 2014, 
1006 marginal 17, AG Kaiserslautern NZI 2006, 47). In these types of situations, the decision of whether a person 
or entity has the right to participate will be determined case-by-case by a discretionary decision (BeckOK 
InsO/Karg, 2017, InsO Article 77 Rn. 1). 
 
However, creditors who are only subordinated to the remaining insolvency claims in the proceedings (Article 39) 
and therefore do not regularly represent any economic value, may participate in the meeting and thus be able to 
inform themselves of the progress of the proceedings, but have no voting rights. The situation is different when 
they act as representatives of the persons who are entitled to vote. In this case, they are given the right to vote by 
the person they represent (Kirchhof, Eidenmüller & Stürner, 2013, Article 77 Rn. 2–6). 
 
Latvian insolvency law only regulates the voting rights of interested persons; there are no regulations on the 
satisfaction of the claims of debtor-related persons. The law prescribes that such creditors who are regarded as 
interested persons cannot vote at the creditors’ meeting. According to Article 87 (5) of the Latvian Insolvency Law 
(2010), creditors who are recognized as interested persons in accordance with Article 72 and persons who have 
acquired the right to make a claim against the debtor from interested persons within one year prior to the 
proclamation of the insolvency proceedings of a legal person, shall not have the right to vote at the creditors’ 
meeting. 
 
Similar to the Estonian BA (Article 117), Latvian insolvency law specifies who are to be recognized as interested 
persons in relation to a debtor. According to Article 72 (2) of the Latvian Insolvency Law, persons are recognized 
as interested persons in relation to a debtor if they have been in this status for the preceding five years prior to the 
day of the proclamation of the insolvency proceedings of the debtor. According to Article 72 (1), interested persons 
are the participants (shareholders) of a debtor or members of a partnership, members of an administrative body, a 
proctor or person with a the commercial power of attorney, a person who is married to, is related to, or has an 
affinity to the second degree with the founder, a participant (shareholder) of the debtor, a member of a partnership 
or member of an administrative body, including a creditor who is in one group of companies with the debtor. 
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Lithuanian bankruptcy law only regulates the voting rights. Article 22 (6) of the Lithuanian Enterprise Bankruptcy 
Law (2001) prescribes that the owner (owners) of the enterprise in bankruptcy and bankrupt enterprise or an 
authorized representative thereof, including an administrator or authorised representative of the municipality 
wherein the immovable property of the enterprise in bankruptcy and the bankrupt enterprise is located, shall have 
the right to attend the meetings of creditors. However, only creditors shall be entitled to vote. 
 
In the light of the examples provided concerning the bankruptcy laws of other countries given above, Estonian law 
is rather atypical, as it does not provide regulations on the participation of debtor-related persons in bankruptcy 
proceedings, especially on the right to vote. Therefore, regulations involving Estonian bankruptcy proceedings 
should be amended on the basis of other countries’ legislation as described above. 
 
 
2.2. Countries that have a regulation on the ranking of claims 
 
Some of the above-mentioned countries who regulate the voting rights of debtor-related persons do not regulate the 
right to satisfy their claim. This is seen, for example, in Latvian and Lithuanian bankruptcy law. However, German 
bankruptcy law provides regulations on the ranking of debtor-related creditors’ claims. 
 
Article 39 (1) of the German InsO prescribes that the subordinated loan claims of lower-ranking creditors can only 
be satisfied in bankruptcy proceedings if all the claims of all other insolvency creditors have been fully paid. 
However, the law was changed in the context of fundamental changes concerning share capital (Andres, Leithaus 
& Dahl, 2014, Article 39 Rn. 1–15) and shareholder loans were the most important issue of the whole GmbH reform 
(Verse, 2008, p. 1110). On the other hand, Article 39 of the InsO is purely procedural (BGH WM 1987, 584) and 
prescribes that certain types of insolvency claims are only to be settled after the full satisfaction of the claims of all 
other insolvency creditors (BeckOK InsO/Prosteder/Dachner, 2017, InsO Article 39 Rn. 1–6). Therefore, 
subordinated creditors can only expect their claims to be satisfied in exceptional cases (Braun, 2017, Article 174 
Rn. 34–35). Holders of such claims are not expected to receive any satisfaction on a regular basis (Nerlich & 
Römermann, 2017, Article 174 Rn. 24–30). 
 
Moreover, according to Article 174 (3) of the InsO, lower-ranking creditors shall only file their claims if they are 
specifically requested by the insolvency court to do so. Upon the filing of such claims, their lower-ranking status 
shall be indicated, and the creditor’s lower rank shall be designated. According to Article 173 (3) sentence 1 of the 
InsO, subordinated insolvency claims (based on Article 39) are only to be registered after a special request by the 
insolvency court. The insolvency court will only issue this request in rare cases in which a distribution to the 
subordinate creditors is seriously considered (according to the reports of the insolvency administrator (if any, 
provisional)) (cf KPB / Pape / 82). This can take place either during the opening decision or later. A subsequent 
request will be made public and transmitted directly to the known subordinated creditors (BeckOK InsO/Zenker, 
2017, InsO Article 174 Rn. 31–32). 
 
In practice, except in the case of an insolvency plan, the German court will not make a request for notification as 
long as there are sufficient funds for at least a partial satisfaction of the subordinate creditors’ claims – this might 
also apply in the residual debt-exemption procedure (Braun, 2017, Article 174 Rn. 34–35). This is only to be 
considered when it is foreseeable that there is not only enough money to enable the complete satisfaction of non-
subordinated insolvency claims, but also to provide for the payment of subordinated insolvency claims (Kirchhof, 
Eidenmüller & Stürner, 2013, Article 174 Rn. 19–20). If the court has given the special request and proofs of claims 
are filed, the creditors must then register (InsO Article 174 (3) sentence 1) in order to gain their status as a party to 
the proceedings and the possibility of rescission. Article 174 (3) of the InsO also means that the insolvency creditor 
is not allowed to register their subordinate claim for the time being, their application filed without effect remains 
void, and the insolvency creditor is not a party to the insolvency proceedings (Nerlich & Römermann, 2017, Article 
174 Rn. 24–30). If the creditor notifies their claim in the sense of Article 39 as a non-subordinated claim, the 
insolvency administrator must include it in the table (Article 175, No. 11). The table is divided into two sections. 
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The demands of Article 38 are entered into the first section and the demands of Article 39 (Article 175, No. 6) are 
put into the second section. The administrator and insolvency creditor can then object to the application at the 
verification meeting (Uhlenbruck, Hirte & Vallender, 2015, Article 174 Rn. 51–55). 
 
Article 73 (4) p 5 of the Latvian Insolvency Law prescribes that in the submission of the creditors’ claims against 
a debtor, it must be indicated as to whether the creditor is recognized as an interested person within the meaning of 
Article 72. However, the Latvian Insolvency Law does not differentiate between claims submitted by interested 
persons and other claims. According to Article 77, the administrator divides the submitted claims of creditors into 
two groups: 1) claims of secured creditors, and 2) claims of non-secured creditors. 
 
The Lithuanian Enterprise Bankruptcy Law does also not provide any special rules on the satisfaction of debtor-
related persons’ claims or subordinated claims. 
 
Although Latvian and Lithuanian bankruptcy laws do not prescribe any rules on the right to satisfy the claims of 
debtor-related creditors, the participation of debtor-related persons is still somewhat restricted and they are unable 
to control the entire process of the bankruptcy proceedings. Estonian bankruptcy law, however, does not regulate 
the participation of debtor-related persons in any way. Therefore, Estonian bankruptcy law should be amended. The 
law should provide that debtor-related creditors, especially in the case of subordinated claims, cannot have the right 
to vote in bankruptcy proceedings. Furthermore, debtor-related persons should not have the right for the satisfaction 
of a claim in the same ranking as other creditors. They should only have the right to satisfaction of their claim if all 
claims of all insolvency creditors have been fully paid. 
 
 
3. Restrictions on the participation of debtor-related persons in bankruptcy proceedings 
 
Different countries have different methods for regulating the participation of debtor-related persons in bankruptcy 
proceedings. The main reason for this is that the participation of debtor-related persons may cause many problems 
in bankruptcy proceedings and harm other creditors. More specifically, the treatment of shareholder loans is a 
controversial issue in many jurisdictions. Legislators and courts have struggled to answer the question of whether 
loan claims from shareholders should be treated differently from loans from non-related creditors (Verse, 2008, p. 
1109). 
 
Firstly, debtor-related persons with voting rights may make decisions at the general meetings of creditors and 
thereby take control of the proceedings. Debtor-related persons, especially shareholders, exercise control over the 
debtor (de Weijs, 2011, p. 237). Moreover, a shareholder’s one and only purpose is to make as much money as 
possible. Thus, the objective of debtor-related persons might be to take control of the proceedings and the 
bankruptcy estate ASAP under most favourable terms and conditions. Obtaining (the majority of the) votes at the 
first general meeting of creditors and electing suitable members to the bankruptcy committee generally means that 
the proceedings will benefit the debtors. However, this harms the rights and interests of non-related creditors. 
 
Secondly, debtor-related persons may control the activities of the bankruptcy trustee. Debtor-related persons, 
especially shareholders, have an advantage over the creditors: information concerning the debtor’s business 
activities (de Weijs, 2011, p. 237). They might have information on whether the insolvency has been caused by an 
act with criminal elements or a grave error in management. However, in proceedings controlled by the debtor, it is 
easier to ensure that the trustee does not establish that kind of information. In that case, the trustee could be 
influenced in order to avoid conducting an audit in accounting, which may reveal severe criminal elements or a 
grave error in management. Thus, no claims are filed against the debtor’s management, which damages the 
creditors’ as well as public interests. The creditors will not receive any money from the claims. In addition, the 
public will be sent a signal that the person who violated their obligations is not liable for their acts or inactivity. 
Debtor-related persons may also delay the proceedings, so the deadlines for the recovery procedures against the 
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persons concerned might be overrun (Schihalejev, 2013). This would also harm the rights and interests of non-
related creditors. 
 
As a result, if debtor-related persons have control over the proceedings and activities of the trustee, and are also 
entitled to the satisfaction of the claim, money can be taken out from the proceedings. However, a debtor-related 
person might be a shareholder with a subordinated loan claim, which, as mentioned above, should be payable after 
all the other creditors’ claims have been covered. Nevertheless, the questions arise as to when is the cause of the 
debtor’s insolvency an act with criminal elements or a grave error in management, and whether the shareholders 
should be victims of unfair treatment and not get the right to participate in the proceedings based on their 
subordinated loan claim. In that case, the management board has caused the insolvency of the company and the 
shareholder might not be responsible for that. Moreover, according to Article 187 (2) of the CC, the management 
board is responsible. 
 
Shareholders should choose loyal and appropriate members of a company’s management body. According to the 
CC, members of the management board are elected and removed by shareholders (Article 168 (1), Article 184 (1); 
or by the supervisory board (Article 309 (1)), who are, in turn, elected by the shareholders (Article 290 (1), Article 
298 (1) p 4, Article 319 (1)). However, according to the CC, if a private or public limited company is insolvent and 
the insolvency is not temporary due to the company’s economic situation, the management board shall promptly 
but not later than within twenty days after the date on which the insolvency became evident, submit the bankruptcy 
petition of the company to a court (Article 180 (51), Article 306 (31). In the case of the insolvency of the company, 
the principle of liquidation or recapitalization applied as a capital maintenance measure is implemented in two 
steps: firstly, the management board is obliged to call a meeting upon the occurrence of insolvency (Article 171 (2) 
p 1, Article 292 (1) p 1), and secondly, the shareholders are obliged to make a decision which results in the recovery 
of the share capital in accordance with the requirements as provided by law (Article 176, Article 301) (Saare, 
Volens, Vutt & Vutt, 2015, pp. 281–282). Thus, shareholders must decide and are obligated to ensure that the share 
capital of the private or public limited company meets the set requirements. Therefore, it can be said that 
shareholders are responsible for the activities of the members of management bodies via elections, which means 
that shareholders should not be entitled to participate in bankruptcy proceedings upon the occurrence of an act with 
criminal elements or a grave error in management. 
 
Moreover, shareholders have more rights than only proprietary interests: the right to participate in decision-making 
and have a vote on issues which play an important role in the company’s business activities (Madaus, 2013, p. 111). 
However, if the company becomes insolvent, then as a general rule it no longer continues its business activities 
(except in the case of rehabilitating the enterprise, which is rare in Estonian practice). Thus, it is not necessary to 
give shareholders the right to vote, because they do not need to negotiate and have no opportunity to make decisions 
about the company’s business activities. Usually the first general meeting of creditors decides whether to terminate 
the activities of the debtor’s undertaking, and whether to terminate the debtor if the debtor is a legal person (Article 
77 p 2–3 of the BA). However, in reorganization proceedings, the company continues its activities, so shareholders 
may need to make decisions and have a voting right, although in a separate group from other creditors (Schihalejev, 
2014). 
 
Nevertheless, there are arguments against restricting the participation of debtor-related creditors with subordinated 
loan claims. The main rationale of it is that the subordination of all shareholder loans will decrease the shareholders’ 
participation in sharing the company’s entrepreneurial risks. This, in turn, prevents shareholders from making any 
decisions that could harm the creditors’ rights and interests. In addition, the bankruptcy petition may be filed in 
court on time when the insolvency appears. On the other hand, subordination may deter shareholders from granting 
any loans to a company in situations where loans would be used for projects that are ex ante efficient (Verse, 2008, 
p. 1115). However, business risks and investments are a natural part of economic activities. Shareholders are the 
owners of the residual value of the ﬁrm and the increase or decrease in their wealth is in direct correlation with the 
changes in the value of the company (Keay, 2015, p. 144). Shareholders have the right to decide on the amount of 
the capital they would invest in the company in order to maximize return and minimize the risk in their investment 
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choices. In the case of a financially successful business, investors can expect to seek return through dividends from 
profits and increases in the share price (Sarra, 2007, p. 182). However, in the case of a financially unsuccessful 
business, shareholders could lose their investment, but risk-taking is a natural part of entrepreneurship. 
 
Furthermore, shareholders might exploit their insider status in order to recover their loan in full. Shareholders are 
often the first to know if and when a company is approaching insolvency (Verse, 2008, p. 1116). Therefore, if there 
are regulations that restrict the rights of debtor-related persons to participate in the proceedings – which, in turn, 
means that shareholders know that it is not possible to recover the loan in bankruptcy proceedings, then shareholders 
might withdraw money from the company even before the bankruptcy petition is submitted to the court. In this 
case, it is possible to file an action for the recovery of transactions (Articles 109–110, Article 113 of the BA). This, 
however, requires financial resources from creditors. 
 
On the other hand, in cases involving other debtor-related creditors’ claims, which are not subordinated loan claims, 
and when the transactions are proven, the participation of debtor-related creditors might be justified. In Estonian 
practice, it is common for individuals to have several companies. Some transactions are concluded with related 
persons (e.g. sale contracts, contracts for the provision of certain services). Thus, the trustee and the courts should 
consider the true nature of the transaction made. The circumstances should be determined and it should be 
ascertained as to whether the claim is can be proven or not. More specifically, it should be determined whether the 
true nature of the legal relationship is based on an investment or on a transaction on the basis of which a creditor is 
entitled to secure a sum of money (Sarra, 2007, p. 198). 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The issue of restrictions on the participation of debtor-related creditors in bankruptcy proceedings has three main 
aspects: submitting a proof of claim, voting at a general meeting of creditors and satisfying the claim. In the case 
of having a majority of the votes, debtor-related creditors can make important decisions at the general meeting of 
creditors, which gives them the opportunity to control the proceedings and the activities of the trustee. 
 
In the light of the examples from other countries’ bankruptcy laws provided above, Estonian law is rather unique, 
as it does not provide regulations on the participation of debtor-related persons in bankruptcy proceedings. This 
means that all debtor-related persons can participate in bankruptcy proceedings. Shareholders can also file a claim 
based on a subordinated loan, vote and require a satisfaction of that claim, which, however, should be paid after all 
other creditors’ claims are covered. Because of the lack of regulations, trustees in bankruptcy are forced to accept 
all claims from debtor-related persons if the proving documents are filed, and they must also accept subordinated 
loan claims. Furthermore, the lack of regulations on the participation of debtor-related persons has led to the 
situation where an objection to the claim of a debtor-related creditor depends on who has control over the process 
of the proceedings: the debtor or the creditors.  
 
It is clear that Estonian bankruptcy law should impose certain restrictions on the participation of debtor-related 
persons in bankruptcy proceedings. The Estonian BA should provide that debtor-related persons, including 
shareholders, should not have the right to participate in bankruptcy proceedings: they should not have the right to 
vote and satisfy the claim before other creditors’ claims have been covered. Such regulations would lead to a more 
uniform practice as well as ensure the protection of creditors’ rights and interests. Creditors could then have 
legitimate expectations and legal certainty that debtor-related persons cannot control the bankruptcy proceedings. 
Moreover, shareholders are taking risks associated with the failure of the company. They should take account of 
ordinary business risks in making their investment decisions and cannot have legitimate expectations that all of the 
invested money can be covered in every aspect. However, in cases that do not involve subordinated loan claims 
where the transactions are proven and which relate to other debtor-related creditors’ claims, the participation of 
debtor-related persons might be justified. 
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